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Abstract
We consider an economy where agents’ consumption sets are given
by the cone L0+ of non-negative measurable functions and whose pref-
erences are defined by additive utilities satisfying the Inada conditions.
We extend to this setting the results in Dana [1] on the existence and
uniqueness of Arrow-Debreu equilibria. In the case of existence, our
conditions are necessary and sufficient.
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1 Main results
This paper states necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of
Arrow-Debreu equilibria in the economy where agents’ consumption sets
are given by the cone L0+ of non-negative measurable functions and whose
preferences are defined by additive utilities satisfying the Inada conditions.
For completeness, a version of a well-known uniqueness criteria is also pro-
vided. The results generalize those in Dana [1]; see Remarks 1.7 and 1.8 for
details.
∗This research was supported in part by the Carnegie Mellon-Portugal Program and
by the Oxford-Man Institute for Quantitative Finance at the University of Oxford.
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Consider an economy with M ∈ {1, 2, . . .} agents and a state space
(S,S, µ) which is a measure space with a σ-finite measure µ. By L0 we
denote the space of (equivalence classes of) measurable functions with values
in [−∞,∞); L0+ stands for the cone of non-negative measurable functions.
For α ∈ L0 we use the convention:
E[α] ,
∫
S
α(s)µ(ds) , −∞ if E[min(α, 0)] = −∞.
The consumption set of mth agent equals L0+ and his preferences are defined
by additive utility:
um(α
m) , E[Um(α
m)], αm ∈ L0+.
The utility measurable field Um : [0,∞)→ L
0 has the following properties.
Assumption 1.1. For every s ∈ S the function Um(·)(s) on (0,∞) is strictly
increasing, strictly concave, continuously differentiable, and satisfies the In-
ada conditions:
lim
c→∞
U ′m(c)(s) = 0, lim
c↓0
U ′m(c)(s) =∞,
At c = 0, by continuity, Um(0)(s) = limc↓0 Um(c)(s); this limit may be −∞.
Remark 1.2. This framework readily accommodates consumption prefer-
ences which are common in Mathematical Finance. For instance, it includes
a continuous-time model defined on a filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0,P)
where the agents consume according to an optional non-negative process
α = (αt) of consumption rates; so that Ct =
∫ t
0 αvdv is the cumulative con-
sumption up to time t. In this case, the state space S = Ω× [0,∞), S is the
optional σ-algebra, and µ(ds) = µ(dω, dt) = P[dω]× dt.
By Λ ∈ L0+ we denote the total endowment in the economy. A family
(αm)m=1,...,M of elements of L
0
+ such that
∑M
m=1 α
m = Λ is called an allo-
cation of Λ. By (αm0 ) ⊂ L
0
+ we denote the initial allocation of Λ between
the agents.
Definition 1.3. A pair (ζ, (αm1 )m=1,...,M ), consisting of a measurable func-
tion ζ > 0 (a state price density) and an allocation (αm1 ) of Λ (an equilibrium
allocation) is an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium if
E[ζΛ] <∞,
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and, for m = 1, . . . ,M ,
E[|Um(α
m
1 )|] <∞,
αm1 = argmax{E[Um(α)] : α ∈ L
0
+, E[ζ(α− α
m
0 )] = 0}. (1)
This is the main result of the paper.
Theorem 1.4. Suppose that Assumption 1.1 holds, the total endowment
Λ > 0, and the initial allocation αm0 6= 0, m = 1, . . . ,M . Then an Arrow-
Debreu equilibrium exists if and only if there is an allocation (αm) of Λ such
that
E[|Um(α
m)|+ U ′m(α
m)Λ] <∞, m = 1, . . . ,M. (2)
Corollary 1.5. Suppose that Assumption 1.1 holds, the total endowment
Λ > 0, the initial allocation αm0 6= 0, m = 1, . . . ,M , and
E[|Um(sΛ)|] <∞, s ∈ (0, 1], m = 1, . . . ,M.
Then an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium exists.
Proof. The concavity of Um implies that
cU ′m(c) ≤ 2(Um(c)− Um(c/2)), c > 0,
and the result follows from Theorem 1.4 where one can take αm = 1
M
Λ.
The Arrow-Debreu equilibrium is, in general, not unique; see, e.g. Ex-
ample 15.B.2 in Mas-Colell et al. [4] which can be easily adapted to our
setting. We state a version of a well-known uniqueness criteria.
Theorem 1.6. Suppose that the conditions of Corollary 1.5 hold and there
is an index m0 such that for m 6= m0
the map c 7→ cU ′m(c) of (0,∞) to L
0
+ is non-decreasing. (3)
Then an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium exists and is unique.
The proofs of Theorems 1.4 and 1.6 are given in Section 3 and rely on
the finite-dimensional characterization of Arrow-Debreu equilibria in Theo-
rem 2.4.
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Remark 1.7. Being necessary and sufficient, the condition (2) improves the
sufficient criteria in Dana [1]. This paper requires the existence of conjugate
exponents p, q ∈ [1,∞], 1
p
+ 1
q
= 1, and measurable functions ζ ∈ Lq+
and η ∈ L1+ such that Λ ∈ L
p
+ and the measurable fields (Um) are twice
continuously differentiable and satisfy
Um(c) ≤ ζc+ η, c > 0, m = 1, . . . ,M,
and
sup
w∈ΣM
Uc(w,Λ)Λ ∈ L
q
+.
Here U(w, c) is the aggregate utility measurable field, see (5) below, and
ΣM is the simplex in RM .
Remark 1.8. If the utility measurable fields (Um) are twice differentiable,
then the key condition (3) is equivalent to the boundedness by 1 of their
relative risk-aversions −cU ′′m(c)/U
′
m(c) and, in this form, is well-known; see,
e.g., Example 17.F.2 and Proposition 17.F.3 in Mas-Colell et al. [4], Theo-
rem 4.6.1 in Karatzas and Shreve [3], and Dana [1]. Note that, contrary to
the above references, we allow this condition to fail for one economic agent.
2 Pareto optimal allocations
In this section we state the properties of Pareto optimal allocations needed
for the proofs of Theorems 1.4 and 1.6.
Definition 2.1. An allocation (αm) of Λ is Pareto optimal if
E[|Um(α
m)|] <∞, m = 1, . . . ,M, (4)
and there is no allocation (βm) of Λ which dominates (αm) in the sense that
E[Um(β
m)] ≥ E[Um(α
m)], m = 1, . . . ,M,
and
E[Ul(β
l)] > E[Ul(α
l)] for some l ∈ {1, . . . ,M}.
See Remark 2.3 for a justification of the integrability condition (4).
As usual, in the study of complete equilibria, an important role is played
by the aggregate utility measurable field U = U(w, c) : RM+ × [0,∞)→ L
0:
U(w, c) , sup{
M∑
m=1
wmUm(c
m) : cm ≥ 0, c1 + · · ·+ cM = c}. (5)
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Here RM+ is the non-negative orthant in R
M without the origin:
RM+ , {w ∈ [0,∞)
M :
M∑
m=1
wm > 0}.
Due to the 1-homogeneity property of U = U(w, c) with respect to the
weight w: U(yw, c) = yU(w, c), y > 0, it is often convenient to restrict its
w-domain to the simplex
ΣM , {w ∈ [0,∞)M :
M∑
m=1
wm = 1}.
Elementary arguments show that for every w ∈ RM+ the measurable field
U(w, ·) on [0,∞) satisfies Assumption 1.1 and that the upper bound in (5)
is attained at the measurable functions pim(w, c), m = 1, . . . ,M , such that
wmU ′m(pi
m(w, c)) = Uc(w, c) ,
∂
∂c
U(w, c) if wm > 0, c > 0, (6)
pim(w, c) = 0 if wm = 0 or c = 0. (7)
These identities readily imply that the measurable fields pim : RM+ ×
[0,∞) → L0+, m = 1, . . . ,M , are continuous and have the following proper-
ties:
(A1) They are 0-homogeneous with respect to w: pim(yw, c) = pim(w, c),
y > 0.
(A2) For c > 0 the measurable field pim(·, c) = pim(w1, . . . , wM , c) is strictly
increasing with respect to wm and strictly decreasing with respect to
wl, l 6= m.
(A3) If c > 0 and w1 and w2 are distinct vectors in Σ
M , then for every s ∈ S
the vectors (pim(w1, c)(s)) and (pi
m(w2, c)(s)) in cΣ
M are distinct.
We state a version of the well-known parametrization of Pareto optimal
allocations by the elements of ΣM .
Theorem 2.2. Suppose that Assumption 1.1 holds. Let Λ > 0 and (αm) be
an allocation of Λ satisfying (4). Then (αm) is Pareto optimal if and only
if there is w ∈ ΣM such that
αm = pim(w,Λ), m = 1, . . . ,M. (8)
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Proof. Assume first that (αm) is Pareto optimal. By the concavity of the
measurable fields (Um), the set
C , {z ∈ RM : zm ≤ E[Um(β
m)] for some allocation (βm) of Λ}
is convex and, in view of (4), it has a non-empty interior. From the Pareto
optimality of (αm) we deduce that the point
ẑm , E[Um(α
m)], m = 1 . . . ,M,
belongs to the boundary of C. Hence, there is a non-zero w ∈ RM such that
M∑
m=1
wmẑm ≥
M∑
m=1
wmzm, z ∈ C. (9)
Since C − [0,∞)M = C, we obtain that wm ≥ 0. Then we can normalize w
to be in ΣM . Observe now that (9) can be written as
E[
M∑
m=1
wmUm(α
m)] = sup{E[
M∑
m=1
wmUm(β
m)] : (βm) is an allocation of Λ}
= E[U(w,Λ)],
which readily implies (8).
Conversely, if (αm) is given by (8), then for any allocation (βm) of Λ
M∑
m=1
wmUm(β
m) ≤ U(w,Λ) =
M∑
m=1
wmUm(α
m),
which yields the Pareto optimality of (αm) after we account for the integra-
bility condition (4) and recall that αm , pim(w,Λ) = 0 if wm = 0.
Remark 2.3. Without the integrability condition (4) in Definition 2.1 the
assertion of Theorem 2.2 does not hold. As a counter-example, take M = 2
and select the total endowment and the utility functions so that Λ > 0,
U1 = U2, and
E[|Ui(Λ)|] <∞ and E[Ui(Λ/2)] = −∞.
Then the allocation (pi1(1/2,Λ), pi2(1/2,Λ)) = (Λ/2,Λ/2) is dominated by
either (0,Λ) or (Λ, 0).
After these preparations, we are ready to state the main result of this
section.
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Theorem 2.4. Suppose that Assumption 1.1 holds, the total endowment
Λ > 0, and the initial allocation αm0 6= 0, m = 1, . . . ,M . Then (ζ, (α
m
1 )) is
an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium if and only if there is w ∈ intΣM , the interior
of ΣM , and a constant z > 0 such that
ζ = zUc(w,Λ), (10)
αm1 = pi
m(w,Λ), m = 1, . . . ,M, (11)
and
E[
M∑
m=1
|Um(pi
m(w,Λ))| + Uc(w,Λ)Λ] <∞, (12)
E[Uc(w,Λ)(pi
m(w,Λ) − αm0 )] = 0, m = 1, . . . ,M. (13)
In this case, the equilibrium allocation (αm1 ) is Pareto optimal.
Remark 2.5. As Lemma 3.1 below shows, the integrability condition (12)
holds for some w ∈ int ΣM if and only if it holds for every w ∈ int ΣM and
is equivalent to the existence of an allocation (αm) of Λ satisfying (2).
For the proof of the theorem we need a lemma.
Lemma 2.6. Let U : [0,∞)→ L0 be a measurable field satisfying Assump-
tion 1.1 and α > 0 and ζ > 0 be measurable functions such that E[ζα] <∞,
and
−∞ < E[U(α)] = sup{E[U(β)] : β ∈ L0+, E[ζ(β − α)] = 0} <∞.
Then
ζ =
E[ζα]
E[U ′(α)α]
U ′(α). (14)
Proof. Let β be a measurable function such that
0 < β < α and E[U(α− β)] > −∞.
For instance, we can choose β so that
U(α)− U(α− β) = min(η, U(2α) − U(α)),
where the measurable function η > 0 and E[η] <∞. Observe that
E[ζβ] <∞ and E[U ′(α)β] <∞, (15)
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where the second bound holds because
U ′(α)β ≤ U(α)− U(α− β).
Take a measurable function γ such that
|γ| ≤ β and E[ζγ] = 0.
From the properties of U in Assumption 1.1 we deduce that for |y| < 1:
U ′(α+ yγ/2)|γ|/2 ≤ U ′(α− β/2)β/2
≤ U(α− β/2)− U(α− β)
≤ U(α)− U(α− β).
Accounting for the integrability of U(α) and U(α − β) we obtain that the
function
f(y) , E[U(α+ yγ/2)], y ∈ (−1, 1),
is continuously differentiable and
f ′(y) = E[U ′(α+ yγ/2)γ/2], y ∈ (−1, 1).
As α is optimal, f attains its maximum at y = 0. Therefore,
f ′(0) = E[U ′(α)γ] = 0.
Thus, we have found a measurable function β > 0 such that (15) holds
and
∀γ ∈ L0 : |γ| ≤ β and E[ζγ] = 0 ⇒ E[U ′(α)γ] = 0. (16)
This readily implies (14). Indeed, if we define the probability measures P
and Q as
dP
dµ
,
ζβ
E[ζβ]
and
dQ
dµ
,
U ′(α)β
E[U ′(α)β]
,
then for a set A ∈ S the implication (16) with γ = β(1A − P[A]) yields that
P[A] = Q[A]. Hence, P = Q and the result follows.
Proof of Theorem 2.4. Assume first that (ζ, (αm1 )) is an Arrow-Debreu equi-
librium. We claim that (αm1 ) is a Pareto optimal allocation of Λ. Indeed,
if there is an allocation (βm) of Λ which dominates (αm1 ) in the sense of
Definition 2.1 then for some l ∈ {1, . . . ,M} either
E[Ul(β
l)] ≥ E[Ul(α
l
1)] and E[ζβ
l] < E[ζαl1]
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or
E[Ul(β
l)] > E[Ul(α
l
1)] and E[ζβ
l] ≤ E[ζαl1],
contradicting the optimality of αl1 in (1).
From Theorem 2.2 we then obtain the representation (11) for (αm1 ) with
w ∈ ΣM . As αm0 6= 0, we have α
m
1 6= 0. Hence, w ∈ int Σ
M and αm1 =
pim(w,Λ) > 0. Lemma 2.6 and the identities (6) now imply (10). Finally,
the properties (12) and (13) are parts of Definition 1.3.
Conversely, let w ∈ int ΣM be such that the conditions (12) and (13)
hold and define (ζ, (αm1 )) by (10) and (11). Except (1) all conditions of
Definition 1.3 hold trivially. The property (1) follows from the inequalities
Um(β
m)−
1
wm
Uc(w,Λ)β
m ≤ sup
c≥0
{Um(c)−
1
wm
Uc(w,Λ)c}
= Um(pi
m(w,Λ)) −
1
wm
Uc(w,Λ)pi
m(w,Λ),
where βm ∈ L0+ and, at the last step, we used the definition of pi
m in (6).
3 Proofs of Theorems 1.4 and 1.6
We begin with some lemmas.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose that Assumption 1.1 holds, the total endowment Λ >
0, and there is an allocation (αm) of Λ satisfying (2). Then
E[|Um(pi
m(w,Λ))|] <∞, w ∈ intΣM , m = 1, . . . ,M, (17)
E[ sup
w∈ΣM
Uc(w,Λ)Λ] <∞. (18)
Proof. First, take w ∈ intΣM . From the monotonicity and the concavity of
Um we deduce that
Um(pi
m(w,Λ)) ≤ Um(Λ) ≤ Um(α
m) + U ′m(α
m)Λ
and from the definition of pim that
M∑
m=1
wmUm(α
m) ≤ U(w,Λ) =
M∑
m=1
wmUm(pi
m(w,Λ)).
These inequalities readily imply (17).
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Assume now that w ∈ ΣM . Since
0 < Λ =
M∑
m=1
pim(w,Λ) =
M∑
m=1
αm,
for every s ∈ S there is an index m(s) such that
0 < pim(s)(w,Λ)(s) and αm(s)(s) ≤ pim(s)(w,Λ)(s).
Accounting for (6) and (7) we deduce that
Uc(w,Λ) ≤ max{w
mU ′m(α
m) : wm > 0} ≤
M∑
m=1
U ′m(α
m),
which implies (18).
The following corollary of the Brouwer’s fixed point theorem plays a key
role. It is well-known, see, e.g., Theorem 6.3.6 in Dana and Jeanblanc [2].
Lemma 3.2. Let fm : Σ
M → R, m = 1, . . . ,M , be continuous functions
such that
fm(w) < 0 if w
m = 0, (19)
M∑
m=1
fm(w) = 0, w ∈ Σ
M . (20)
Then there is ŵ ∈ int ΣM such that
fm(ŵ) = 0, m = 1, . . . ,M, (21)
Proof. Since
gm(w) ,
wm +max(0,−fm(w))
1 +
∑M
n=1max(0,−fn(w))
, m = 1, . . . ,M,
are continuous maps of ΣM into ΣM , the Brouwer’s fixed point theorem
implies the existence of ŵ ∈ ΣM such that
ŵm = gm(ŵ) =
ŵm +max(0,−fm(ŵ))
1 +
∑M
n=1max(0,−fn(ŵ))
, m = 1, . . . ,M,
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In view of (19), we obtain that ŵ ∈ intΣM . From (20) we deduce the
existence of an index l such that fl(ŵ) ≥ 0. Then
0 < ŵl =
ŵl
1 +
∑M
m=1max(0,−fm(ŵ))
,
implying that fm(ŵ) ≥ 0, m = 1, . . . ,M . Another use of (20) yields the
result.
Proof of Theorem 1.4. The “only if” part follows directly from Theorem 2.4,
which, in particular, implies that the inequality (2) holds for any equilibrium
allocation (αm1 ).
Conversely, assume that (2) holds for some allocation (αm) of Λ. From
Lemma 3.1 we obtain the bound (18). The dominated convergence theorem
and the continuity of the measurable fields pim(·,Λ) and Uc(·,Λ) on Σ
M
imply the continuity of the functions
fm(w) , E[Uc(w,Λ)(pi
m(w,Λ) − αm0 )], w ∈ Σ
M .
In view of (7) and as αm0 6= 0 the functions (fm) satisfy (19) and since
M∑
m=1
αm0 =
M∑
m=1
pim(w,Λ) = Λ,
they also satisfy (20).
Lemma 3.2 then implies the existence of ŵ ∈ int ΣM such that (21)
holds. The result now follows from Theorem 2.4 where the integrability
condition (12) for w = ŵ holds because of Lemma 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 1.6. The existence follows from Corollary 1.5. To verify
the uniqueness we define the excess utility functions:
hm(w) , E[U
′
m(pi
m(w,Λ))(pim(w,Λ) − αm0 )]
=
1
wm
E[Uc(w,Λ)(pi
m(w,Λ) − αm0 )], w ∈ intR
M
+ .
By Lemma 3.1, these functions are well-defined and finite. The condition (3),
the properties (A1) and (A2) for pim = pim(w, c), and the fact that the
stochastic field U ′m = U
′
m(c) is strictly decreasing imply that
(B1) For everym = 1, . . . ,M , the function hm is 0-homogeneous: hm(yw) =
hm(w), w ∈ intR
M
+ , y > 0.
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(B2) For m 6= m0, where m0 is the index for which (3) may not hold, the
function hm has the gross-substitute property: hm = hm(w
1, . . . , wM )
is strictly decreasing with respect to wl, l 6= m.
Theorem 2.4 and the property (A3) for pim = pim(w, c) yield the unique-
ness if we can show that the equation
hm(w) = 0, m = 1, . . . ,M,
has no multiple solutions on intΣM . Let w1 and w2 be two such solutions,
w1 6= w2. Assume that w
m0
1 ≤ w
m0
2 ; of course, this does not restrict any
generality. Then
y , max
m=1,...,M
wm1
wm2
> 1,
and there is an index l0 6= m0 such that yw
l0
2 = w
l0
1 . From (B1) we obtain
that
hm(yw2) = hm(w2) = 0, m = 1, . . . ,M,
while from the gross-substitute property in (B2) that
hl0(yw2) < hl0(w1) = 0.
This contradiction concludes the proof.
Acknowledgments. The author thanks Kim Weston for comments and
corrections.
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